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BAGHDAD: Iraq is at a historical crossroads 
on the bumpy road to democracy. The 
Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) has 
all but completed the task assigned to it by 
the 2005 Constitution under the chairmanship 
of Sheikh Humam Hamoudi, the delegate of 
the largest parliamentary bloc, together with 
Dr. Fouad Masum, the head of the Kurdish 
bloc, and Dr. Selim Jiburi, a leading MP from 
the speaker’s bloc. This smaller committee 
sits in the midst of concentric rings, first 
within a larger committee of strongly representative currents, from Prime Minister 
Nouri al-Maliki’s colleagues MPs Ali Allaq and Abbas Bayyati, to the more secular-
liberal MPs Aliya Nsayyef, Communist party secretary general Majid Hamid and 
Kurdish Feryad Rawanduzi. The Committee is supported by a small technical group 
comprising Dr. Mayyada Ihtishami, head of research in the Iraqi Parliament (the CoR, 
Council of Representatives), a dedicated rapporteur in the person of Dr. Hasan Yasiri, 
and Dr. Hamoudi’s able aide Ali Fadhel Muhsin. A larger ring of the CRC consists of 
27 MPs, then the full Parliament who must vote with a simple majority on the 
amendments before they are put before the people for approval. Nor did the CRC 
hesitate in soliciting comparative constitutional expertise to Dr.aw on the best 
practices it saw fit for Iraq’s constitution
Since the relatively recent constitutional pacts emerging from the American and 
French revolutions, one of two routes is available for writing a constitution. Either 
one person is entrusted with drafting the full document, as is said of constitutional 
scholar Hans Kelsen for Germany’s Weimar constitution or General de Gaulle’s 
trusted aide Michel Debré for France’s 1958 Constitution, or it is a decidedly 
collective endeavor of several “founding fathers.” The advantage in sole authorship is 
the coherence of the text, but the result gets inevitably constrained by the philosophy 
of the drafter, however scholarly and detached he tries to be. The advantage of the 
alternative collective route is in the daily exchange of arguments and the participation 
of representatives from large sectors of the national constituency. The disadvantage of 
committee work is that the text inevitably loses coherence and style.
This was the case in the collective route Iraqis chose for both drafting the Constitution 
in 2005 and the work of the CRC since, and we had the signal honor of accompanying 
some of its recent deliberations, and witnessing a special Iraqi moment on the road for 
the rule of law in the country.
Domestic and regional turmoil stand in eerie contrast with the equanimity and wisdom 
constantly displayed in the CRC’s work. There was no taboo in the discussions, and 
the measured and engaging style of the CRC chairman will secure a choice place in 
history for Iraqi constitutionalism.
The CRC work is unprecedented because of an Iraqi constitutional specificity. The 
Committee was tasked to complete the unfinished aspects of the 2005 text under the 
Constitution’s own exceptional terms. It operates under Art. 142, which allows the 
amendments agreed to be passed by Parliamentarian majority in one go, whereas the 
normal procedure of Article 126 makes its adoption far more difficult because of the 
lengthier procedure and a higher parliamentary majority required.
Despite the continued violence forced onto Iraqi society, there was a profound 
difference in the atmosphere of the CRC work with the one prevailing in 2005. Then, 
the committee drafted the Constitution amidst rivers of blood that saw the daily 
sacrifice of between 60 and 100 civilians. This also forced the constituents to leave 
some 50 out of the 144 articles of the 2005 text unfinished by its own accord, and the 
need for the CRC to remedy these gaps. We saw the members of the Committee 
discuss articles one by one, addressing loopholes that are inevitable in any 
constitution arising after 40 years of dictatorship, and improving upon areas where 
consensus could be reached. Corrections and addenda were necessary in large and 
small matters, ranging from dates and deadlines to quotas and majorities.
In addition to important details of a technical nature, in one case the date of the 
parliamentary elections which remained long uncertain because of the obscurity of 
Article 56, some constitutional gaps were particularly important. The Committee had 
to address the increase in the number of deputies in the light of continued population 
increase, the delineation of financial and budgetary principles, and the structure of the 
judiciary, especially in its constitutional role as protector of the basic rights of Iraqis, 
as individuals and as groups.
Maybe the most important achievement in the four-year, on and off work of the CRC, 
was to address the more general constitutional structure in Iraq obtaining from its 
unique social fabric, whether in the national division between Kurds and Arabs, or the 
deep communitarian cleavages between Sunnis and Shiites, amidst a large number of 
smaller national and religious groups which form an unusual mosaic even by Middle 
Eastern standards. The overall constitutional structure departs from Iraq’s “unity” 
(Arabic “wahda,” Art.1), but its real distinctiveness is its “federal” (Arabic “ittihadi”, 
also in Art.1) character, which expresses the desire of citizens, national and religious 
groups to live together in a constitutional mode that needs to be reinvented every day. 
Federalism is always a process, unlike “unity,” which is a mere statement of fact. The 
federal process requires institutions to ensure that the normal differences and 
disagreements get resolved without violence, producing at the same time what a 
famous decision from the American Supreme Court called a “laboratory” for the 
whole country. The diversity secured by federalism constitutes a permanent lab in 
which a particular region or institution or group experiments a preferred model, which 
can fail or succeed. Only if it succeeds is the experiment likely to be adopted 
elsewhere in the country.
The constitutional construct, in a federal system, cannot be completed without a body 
that actively shares in the legislative process. Names of this “upper chamber” vary. In 
the US it is called Senate, in Germany Bundesrat. In Iraq, it is the “Federation 
Council, majlis al-ittihad,” which is established by Art. 48 (“The federal legislative 
power shall consist of the Council of Representatives and the Federation Council”), 
but it is not developed other than in the stipulation by Article 65 that the Federation 
Council shall be established later by law.
The Federation Council is needed by the Iraqi constitutional construct for other 
reasons than underlined usually. The diversity of the country in its various aspects, 
national, ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, even tribal, is a fact that does not require the 
Constitution to acknowledge it. Rather, the Federation Council is needed to transform 
the factual diversity of Iraqi society in a constitutional process that touches upon a 
wide range of the citizen’s concerns: from freedom of movement to the power of the 
police and the courts, to sharing the country’s resources and wealth. The Federation 
Council secures a process and does not consecrate a fact. The people’s elected 
representatives in the Federation Council do not congregate so much to defend the 
interests of their constituencies within the regions as to offer the appropriate channels 
to convey these interests and views in the heart of the constitutional and political 
decision. As President Jalal Talibani told us in conversation, “federalism is 
meaningless in the absence of democracy.” A democratic system naturally ensures the 
representation of Kurds in Irbil, or Najafis in Najaf, or Mosulites in Mosul on their 
respective home turfs. But it is the federal system that guarantees the voice of Kurds, 
Najafis and Mosulites in the heart of national decision-making, in Baghdad.
It is true that Kurds, Najafis and Mosulites also elect their representatives in the 
Council of Representatives, the lower house, but the functional difference is essential 
here, because the function of the Council of Representatives blurs representation into 
one, whereas the members of the Federation Council are expected to project a 
representation which is specific to the interests of their regions, and so adds a voice 
which is constitutionally different from the vote of the deputy. The regional voices in 
the center ensure that federal laws are institutionally attentive to the diversity and 
expectations that come from the periphery.
This marks the most important achievement of the CRC, which has filled the 
Federation Council gaping hole left by the Iraqi Constitution.
It may be that the Council of Representatives can create the Federation Council by 
passing a law (requiring a two-third majority), but the seriousness required by an 
institution as important as the FC suggests that its natural place is the constitution, and 
not a mere law passed by parliamentary majority even if qualified.
Any jurist, indeed any citizen who cares to peruse a constitution, or its amendments, 
will be able to discern remaining gaps, and it is in the nature of a constitution to 
remain a dead letter outside daily political practice, and the review by courts of rival 
interpretations when the constitutional text is applied. Regardless of inevitable 
shortcomings, the completion of the constitutional amendment process provides for a 
national coming together which is unprecedented in a young democracy like Iraq. 
Such reconciliation operates at the highest possible level, the constitutional level. The 
CRC’s hard work deserves to be enacted if only because to show that Iraqis take their 
constitutional institutions seriously, especially the Federation Council.
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